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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The notion that a legal education is meant to convey to students an idea of how to 
“think like lawyers”2 is central to the modern legal academy.  Over the past few 
decades there has been a tremendous amount of scholarship devoted to exactly what 
                                                                
1Assistant Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law, Grundy, Virginia.  B.A. 
(Cleveland State University); J.D. (Howard University School of Law); LL.M. (Beasley 
School of Law at Temple University); Ph.D. candidate (University of Oregon).  This article is 
dedicated to the memory of my friends Tom Blackwell and Tony Sutin, both of whom were 
tragically taken from us on January 16, 2002.  The research for this Article was completed 
during my tenure as an Abraham Freedman Fellow and Lecturer in Law at Temple Law 
School.  I would like to thank the Dean and Faculty of the Beasley School of Law for their 
generous fellowship and support.  Thanks also to Kirsten ButleRitchie, Rick Greenstein and 
Dale Rubin for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.  Finally, I owe a 
significant debt to Kimberly Klock for her capable and dogged research assistance, and to 
Lawrence B. Smith for his help in putting the finishing touches on the manuscript. 
2As opposed, say, to leaning how to “act like lawyers” or “perform like lawyers.”  These 
ideas would be much closer to how medical students are trained.  Medical students are, of 
course, taught how to “think like doctors,” but this is done in the context of a practical 
education.  Some interesting work has been done on the question of inculcating the analytical 
skills of “thinking like a lawyer” in the context of practical skills training.  See, e.g., Fernando 
Colon-Navarro, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Expert-Novice Differences in Simulated Client 
Interviews, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 107 (1996); Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think, 
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57 (1992). 
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the phrase means.3  In the current legal lexicon it may be accurately said that 
“thinking like a lawyer” is a simulacrum for competing notions of what a legal 
education is, or should be, all about.  As one may suspect, then, there is little 
agreement as to what exactly “thinking like a lawyer” means.4  This lack of precision 
has led to a widespread ambivalence toward the phrase by students, faculty and the 
general public.  Even with this imprecise use, however, the phrase retains currency 
with each new generation of law students.   
Traditionally, the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” was applied to the sort of 
instructional philosophy that was the foundation of the law school curriculum.  The 
case law method and the focus on the adversarial process of the American legal 
system dominated notions of what “thinking like a lawyer” entailed.5  This led to a 
presumption that legal education should, normatively, focus on the reasoning skills 
involved in the litigation process.6  As a result, “thinking like a lawyer” was an 
encapsulation of the analytical and cultural process that law students encountered in 
American law schools on their way to becoming practicing attorneys.  Everything 
about the legal academy was tied, in some complex mixture, to the idea of “thinking 
like a lawyer.” 
The trend in recent years, however, has been to view the traditional notion of 
“thinking like a lawyer” as unduly narrow and restrictive.  Legal educators like 
James Elkins,7 Carrie Menkle-Meadow8 and Nancy Schultz9 have attempted to widen 
the scope of what constitutes “thinking like a lawyer” to justify the inclusion and 
acceptance of non-traditional skills courses10 into the legal academy.  These and 
                                                                
3See, e.g., Richard K. Neumann, Donald Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, and the 
Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 401, 405 (2000); David N. 
Yellen, “Thinking Like a Lawyer” or Acting Like a Judge, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (1998); 
Kevin H. Smith, Practical Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and Synthesizing the Art and 
Science of Thinking Like a Lawyer, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (1998); James R. Elkins, Thinking 
Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV. 511, 519 (1996); Colon-Navarro, supra 
note 2; Gail A. Jaquish & James Ware, Adopting an Educator Habit of Mind: Modifying What 
it Means to “Think Like a Lawyer”, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1713 (1993); Schultz, supra note 2; 
Emily Calhoun, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 507 (1984); John O. Mudd, 
Thinking Critically About “Thinking Like a Lawyer”, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 704 (1983). 
4Mudd, supra note 3, at 705. 
5Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is there a Case Against the Case 
System?, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 170 (1986). 
6As Walter Van Valkenburg has said, “legal culture became increasingly dependent on 
adjudication as a central component in the American system of law at the same time Langdell 
and his followers stressed the study of appellate opinions in their teaching and scholarship.”  
E. Walter Van Valkenburg, Law Teachers, Law Students, and Litigation, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
584, 594 (1984). 
7Elkins, supra note 3, at 519. 
8Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: The Lawyer as Problem 
Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2000). 
9Schultz, supra note 2. 
10Examples of non-traditional skill courses include Alternative Dispute Resolution 
[hereinafter ADR], Interviewing, Negotiating and Counseling, and Legal Research and 
Writing. 
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other scholars seem to believe that the restrictive notion of what “thinking like a 
lawyer” entails hinders the full and complete acceptance of what counts as 
“lawyering.”11  This is a complex normative assumption, and one which I believe to 
be flawed.  While I fully embrace the move to incorporate more diverse and varied 
educational experiences in to the law school curriculum, I am not sure that 
expanding the concept of “thinking like a lawyer” to include every possible task or 
skill that a practitioner may need to be acquainted with is as productive as many 
think. 
In what follows, the traditional notion, which is hereinafter referred to as the 
“narrow notion,” will be discussed so as to situate that narrow understanding within 
the broad field of legal pedagogy.  This Article maintains that this narrow notion 
retains some normative and pedagogical usefulness, especially in the context of 
introducing entering law students to rudimentary and formalized legal reasoning 
skills.  In a sense, this narrow notion of what constitutes “thinking like a lawyer” 
helps expose students to a new and distinct ontology.  This sort of introduction is 
necessary, I suggest, in order for students to develop the more textured and mature 
reasoning abilities and practical skills which Elkins, Menkel-Meadow, Schultz and 
others rightly identify as vital to the mature practice of law.   
This view is then contrasted with the notion, put forth by some, that the sort of 
cognitive skills and abilities that fall under this narrow notion of “thinking like a 
lawyer” are really not distinct to legal reasoning at all.  This Article ultimately rejects 
such an argument as not accounting for the distinct epistemological situatedness of 
legal reasoning.  This Article then turns to the idea that the sort of narrow notion of 
“thinking like a lawyer,” which I have developed, is vital to students as they build a 
domain specific understanding of the context and culture of law in the American 
legal system.  Integrating the narrow notion of “thinking like a lawyer” is important 
for students as it initiates them into the world of the law in contemporary American 
society.  It is, in essence (and for lack of a better term), an indoctrination into the 
world of adversarialism and advocacy. 
I recognize the limitations of any pedagogical system that utilizes the formalism 
and rote parroting, which the term indoctrination suggests and the practice invariably 
yields.  Accordingly, this Article moves on to discuss how the narrow notion of 
“thinking like a lawyer” actually gives students an important backdrop against which 
they can critically access the limitations of the legalistic and formalist strains of 
thought, which hinder the abilities of law students and practicing attorneys from 
developing well honed analytical abilities and practical skills.  This Article 
concludes by suggesting that the sort of mature and expansive notion which many 
legal educators want to call “thinking like a lawyer” is actually limited by that 
phraseology.  This Article argues that we should really call these broader notions 
“lawyering,” as this term more accurately captures the fact that this more expansive 
set of cognitive and practical skills is continually honed and developed throughout 
one’s professional career.  Also this allows for the obvious fact that many of the 
skills that proponents of the more expansive notion propose fall outside the scope of 
traditional legal thinking in the narrow sense.  In my view, then, “thinking like a 
lawyer” is narrower and more simplistic than “lawyering.”  Both, of course, have a 
place in legal education; the former is a necessary introduction that helps situate the 
                                                                
11See Schultz, supra note 2. 
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texture and sophisticated nature of the latter for students as they move through their 
careers as students and attorneys. 
II.  THE TRADITION OF TEACHING STUDENTS TO “THINK LIKE LAWYERS” 
For generations legal educators have impressed upon the students who they have 
taught, especially first year law students, that the experience they must garner from 
their studies is to learn how to “think like a lawyer.”12  What exactly does this mean 
though?  There seems to be no consensus about exactly what we mean when we use 
the phrase.13 Virtually every legal educator imbues the phrase with what they 
consider to be intuitive understanding,14 yet, the definitional parameters of the phrase 
remain slippery and elusive.  This gives scholars with widely divergent notions of 
the proper aims of American law schools latitude to co-opt the phrase.   
Does this lack of a consistent or widely-accepted definition of what “thinking 
like a lawyer” means render the term incoherent and useless?  I do not think that it 
does.  Even though the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” is malleable and slippery, 
there is a serviceable core that retains an important formative element for law 
students, particularly first year law students.  This formative core relates to the 
initiative effect of legal pedagogy early in a law student’s legal education.  In 
essence, first year law students must be initiated into a professional paradigm.  Legal 
educators do this, often uncritically, by employing a highly stylized and formal 
analytical regimen in the classroom.  This regimen involves molding the analytical 
abilities of a diverse body15 of students in order for the entire group to begin to think 
about the law in a predictable and professionally congruent manner, which is what I 
take to be the substance behind the phrase “thinking like a lawyer.” 
This notion of “thinking like a lawyer” plays on the idea that lawyers have a 
distinct and particular way of thinking that differs from other professionals.16  As 
controversial as this may be, there is something compelling to this argument.  Legal 
professionals do, in fact, have a distinct way of thinking about the world, and 
perhaps the most fundamental thing that law professors must do is to begin to teach 
their students to think about problems and fact-based situations in roughly the same 
ways that lawyers think.17  Part of what makes the legal profession a profession18 is  
                                                                
12Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 
121, 122-23 (1994); Kenney Hegland, Quibbles, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1491, 1516 (1989). 
13Mudd, supra note 3, at 705. 
14Saunders & Levine, supra note 12. 
15Diverse in terms of age, economic background, ethnicity, gender, ideology and race.  
16Saunders & Levine, supra note 10, at 122-23. 
17Those of us who teach skills courses are mindful of the fact that thinking as lawyers 
think, however, is only part of the picture.  Being able to think like a lawyer frequently does 
not translate, for instance, into being able to communicate or write like lawyers.  See, e.g., 
Smith, supra note 3, at 7. 
18Neumann, supra note 3, at 408. 
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that initiates must learn a new ontology,19 a new Weltanschauung.  The law school 
experience is, in many ways, similar to other formative (or re-formative, as the case 
may be) enterprises such as military “boot-camp.”20  Initiates learn to think according 
to new rules and regulations; they are taught a new language;21 their creativity and 
intellectual vigor are channeled into a highly formalized and rigidly controlled 
continuum of thought and they are instilled with a sense of esprit de corps and 
professional responsibility.  Some may go so far as to agree with the sentiments of 
one of my first year writing students that “[we] are really just trying to brainwash 
those who have decided to pursue a career in the law.”  In any event, the nearly 
universal notion that lawyers think and communicate differently rings true at some 
important level. 
The initiation into thinking like a lawyer has a tremendous formative effect on 
first year law students.  Like most initiation rituals, learning to “think like a lawyer” 
plays on various psychological and psycho-social insecurities that students bring 
with them to law school.22  Learning how to “think like a lawyer” in this first year of 
law school involves immersing students in a world that is alien and, in many ways, 
frightening.  Students are expected to learn a new language, a new way of looking at 
the world, and a new and distinct way of expressing their understanding.  The first 
year of their studies is a time of great ambiguity and excitement for law students.23  
As James Boyd White stated: 
                                                                
19Whether the mind-set which is taught to law students is actually an ontology in the truest 
sense of the word (i.e., whether legal pedagogy cuts to the center of one’s being) is certainly 
debatable.  The metaphysical and epistemological complexion of this is interesting in its own 
right, but is beyond the scope of what I hope to accomplish here.  For purposes of this paper, 
then, I will use the term ontological in a purely descriptive sense to convey the mind-set or 
world-view that legal professionals share. 
20For those of us who have been through both law school and boot camp, the parallels are 
obvious. 
21For centuries this language was functionally a private language which kept those who 
did not have legal training outside the machinations of the legal system.  See Dragan 
Milovanovic, Postmodern Law and Subjectivity: Lacan and the Linguistic Turn, in DAVID S. 
CAUDILL AND STEVEN JAY GOULD, RADICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, CONTEMPORARY 
CHALLENGES TO MAINSTREAM LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 38-44 (1995) (discussing an 
application of Jacques Lacan’s discourse theory of exclusion). But see LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 243-315 (1958).  This exclusivity mystifyied the 
profession and established social and political power advantages for those who possessed such 
training.  One of the truly important consequences of the so-called plain English movement is 
to de-mystify the law.  Whether this will have the effect of correcting the social and political 
power imbalances that legal professionals maintain is yet to be seen.  A great deal of work has 
been done on this issue by feminist legal theorists.  For a good discussion of this, see B. 
Arrigo, Rethinking the Language of Law, Justice and Community: Postmodern Feminist 
Jurisprudence, RADICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 88-107.  Much of this feminist literature is 
based in Michel Foucault’s work.  See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION 
(1965). 
22For a general discussion of the psychological theories associated with legal pedagogy, 
see Saunders & Levine, supra note 12, at 122-23. 
23James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought 
(and Ought Not) To Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1986). 
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From the student’s point of view, this year is exciting, often transforming.  
Pushed by their circumstances and by themselves as perhaps they have 
never been pushed before, they find resources they did not know they had 
and discover themselves undergoing a profound change: from bright 
young students to bright young lawyers ready to go to work in the world.24 
It is this transformation, which White so astutely describes, that is the principle 
aim of the first year of law school, and which is encapsulated in the narrow notion of 
“thinking like a lawyer.”  As an initiate, learning how to “think like a lawyer” 
involves experiencing the world of the law in a distinct and unique way.  
Experiencing this first entre to the world of American law, while it is in many ways 
highly stylized and superficial, allows students to acquaint themselves with the 
verities of this world, introduces them to rudimentary notions about the workings of 
actors in that world, and allows them to begin their admission process to the 
profession. 
A.  Introducing the Ontology of Law by Teaching Students to “Think Like Lawyers” 
Virtually all of the things that entering law students are exposed to during their 
first year of studies relate back to this idea that they must learn how to “think like 
lawyers.”  All of the skills they are expected to master (the gathering and culling of 
facts, issue spotting, rudimentary legal research, application of law to facts, etc.) 
reinforce the notion that the law, or more properly, the legal profession, is an 
intellectual world25 distinct from any other.  The law is a domain of human inquiry 
that draws upon the basic cognitive and analytical abilities of the actors within the 
domain, but which makes interpretive sense primarily in the context of the domain 
itself.26  When a student undertakes a legal education, she must develop a “legal 
mind” in order to fully mold her analytical and cognitive capabilities in a fashion that 
will enable her to think about the law in a way which situates her within the 
domain.27  While I need not go into the epistemology of this here, it should suffice to 
say that human cognition is perhaps best understood in the context of particular 
cultural constructs.28  It is the immersion of actors within a tradition that gives 
                                                                
24Id. 
25I used to teach logic to upper level philosophy students, and would frequently discuss 
“possible world” scenarios in the context of the work of Saul Kripke.  See generally, SAUL 
KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980).  For a more directly applicable discussion see DAVID 
LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS (1986). 
26See JILL J. RAMSFIELD, THE LAW AS ARCHITECTURE:  BUILDING LEGAL DOCUMENTS 7-20 
(2000). 
27Id. 
28See, e.g., JOHN MCDOWELL, MIND AND WORLD (1994), 95-99 (stating “[w]hen particular 
traditions seem ossified or hide-bound, that encourages a fantasy that one should discard 
reliance on tradition altogether, whereas the right response would be to insist that a respectable 
tradition must include an honest responsiveness to reflective criticism.”).  This “fantasy” is 
what I believe drives the criticism of the traditional understanding of “thinking like a lawyer.”  
In recent years, numerous commentators have criticized this traditional understanding and 
have attempted to stretch the phrase to include a whole host of analytical and practical skills.  
See generally, supra note 3.  While many of these skills and abilities are useful for legal 
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expression to the cognitive abilities of any actor within that tradition or culture.29  
The law, perhaps more so in America than any society or culture before, has a 
distinct and important tradition that maintains its own mores and modes of 
understanding.   
It is this background in culture and tradition that gives lawyers30 (as actors in the 
legal system) the context within which their cognitive and analytical understanding 
of legal issues and problems makes sense.  The content of legal thinking, then, 
depends on having an understanding of shared cultural constructs and traditions.31  
As the philosopher John McDowell says, “[t]o understand empirical content in 
general, we need to see it in its dynamic place in a self-critical activity, the activity 
by which we aim to comprehend the world as it impinges upon our senses.”32  The 
law, like any distinct culture, maintains a set of activities, which the actors employ to 
give content to their understanding.    
When students enter law school, they “enter a discourse community and 
gradually acquire expertise in [this] new domain.”33  In order for law students to gain 
the requisite familiarity with this system, they must mold their cognitive abilities in 
such a way that they can begin to understand and use the “specialized vocabulary 
and theoretical constructs”34 that actors in the legal system utilize.  Jill Ramsfield 
draws from the linguistic theory of John Swales35 in maintaining that the law is a 
distinct discourse theory because the profession has: 
1. A broadly agreed upon set of common goals; 
2. Mechanisms of intercommunication among its members; 
3. Ways to use these mechanisms to provide information and feedback;  
4. A register that uses particular genres to further its aims and a specific lexis, 
syntax and phraseology; and 
5. A threshold level of members with appropriate expertise.36 
Before one can utilize this distinct mode of discourse effectively, she must have 
mastered its basic elements thoroughly.  Complex thinking within the domain, then, 
is contingent on having the appropriate expertise.37 
                                                          
practitioners, I am not so sure that bootstrapping them into the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” 
is coherent. 
29Id. 
30Here I do not mean just practicing lawyers, but judges, legal educators and–almost 
invariably–legislators as well. 
31James Elkins suggests that when educators use the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” they 
assume that “lawyers think in a particular and stylized way that is worth passing on as an 
essential part of legal craft and heritage.”  Elkins, supra note 3, at 512. 
32See MCDOWELL, supra note 28, at 34.   
33Saunders & Levine, supra note 12, at 142-43.  See also, RAMSFIELD, supra note 26. 
34Jaquish & Ware, supra note 3, at 1716. 
35See JOHN SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS (1990). 
36RAMSFIELD, supra note 26, at 17. 
37Id. at 7-20. 
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Law schools are tasked with introducing the complexities of both the distinct 
discourse and complex domain.38  As James Elkins states,  
The story of legal education is the story of how one learns legal discourse, 
and how the world and its problems can be seen through the prism of 
linguistic categories and rhetorical strategies known to law.  Seeing the 
world in this way is relatively easy, and with encouragement and time 
(always a problem) the student begins to learn the skill of legal 
discourse.39 
Legal educators help students take the first tentative and stumbling steps in the 
direction of a fuller appreciation of the legal domain.  The first steps are, admittedly 
and by necessity, simplistic, highly formal and overly stylized.  This basic structure 
enables students to move from the neophyte to the novice.  This move is vital, as it 
prepares students for the more complex and textured understanding that they will 
need to develop in order to become fully accepted members of the profession.  While 
these steps are rudimentary and simple, they have profound impact on the education 
and training which follows.40 
This simple and beginning stage employs certain stylized and formal activities in 
order to initiate students to this new world of thinking.  Chief among these activities 
are those related to the representation of the interests of others in an adversary 
system, which pits advocates against one another in an effort to resolve disputes.41  
The perception that most actors in the American legal system share regarding this 
system, rightly or wrongly, is that this sort of arrangement best represents the 
interests of justice and fairness for those represented.42  As a result, entering law 
students must be exposed to, and in turn master, simplistic and untextured analytical 
and discourse skills that are crude approximations of what fully initiated actors in the 
domain would exhibit.43  Part of this whole process is the instilling of advocacy skills 
that are an important part of any lawyer’s repertoire.  Indeed, much of the first year 
curriculum in American law schools is aimed at having students dissect legal 
arguments (largely extracted from appellate opinions) and apply them to shifting 
factual situations.44  These discussions, which usually occur in a Socratic exchange 
                                                                
38Saunders & Levine, supra note 12, at 144. 
39Elkins, supra note 3, at 520. 
40Elkins, supra note 3, at 520.  I accept the argument, proposed to me by Rick Greenstein, 
that this has an important, and potentially troubling, normative effect on the students, in that 
they may perceive or interpret this simplistic and rudimentary notion of legal thinking as being 
amoral.  As I discuss later in this paper, I think this is why legal educators must urge their 
students through this initial stage in their legal education.  See infra section V.  For a good 
discussion of the ethical problems associated with the narrow notion of legal thinking see Jane 
B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional Responsibility, 15 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2001). 
41Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the 
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 531-33 (1980-81). 
42Id. 
43RAMSFIELD, supra note 26. 
44ARTHUR T. VANDERBUILT, II, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW 53-54 (1979).  
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between student and teacher,45 are almost universally in the context of litigation in 
the adversary system.46  This socialization sets the foundation for the students’ 
understanding of the domain specific context which was discussed above. 
The main vehicle for this sort of training in law schools is the case law method.  
The Langdellian case law method is designed to enable law professors to train large 
classes of incoming students to understand the logic, language and context of legal 
decision-making.47  Law students, especially first year law students, are expected to 
read, digest and be able to discuss cases, and the concepts that can be derived from 
these cases, in the so-called doctrinal areas of the law (civil procedure, contracts, 
property, torts, etc.).48  All law schools extensively employ this method of teaching 
students “how to think like lawyers” in their first year curriculum.49  From this 
experience, law professors expect that they can help mold the thinking of their 
students to conform to the expected standards of the profession that these students 
have chosen to enter.  The case-law method, along with the Socratic approach of 
dialogue between students and their professor,50 is meant to instill in students the 
notion of how they need to think if they are to be successful in law school, and in the 
profession generally.51  This technique of training lawyers is tried and true.  It has, 
after all, yielded some of the most important legal minds in American 
jurisprudence.52  Countless practicing attorneys, from the largest most prestigious 
firms in Los Angeles, New York and Washington, DC to the most humble solo 
practices in Appalachia, have learned their craft in just this fashion.  There must be 
something to the method of teaching law students we have employed for generations 
is both useful and effective.   
At some level, the vast majority of law professors who spend much time thinking 
about pedagogy would agree the case law method has its strengths.53  While almost 
every professor would have their own definition of what “thinking like a lawyer” 
means,54 there would be near unanimity that the typical first year curriculum is 
helpful at some level in getting students there.  As one commentator has said: 
                                                                
45See id. at 53-54.  See also RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO 
CLEAR LEGAL THINKING (1992). 
46JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 10, 12-13 (1983). 
47See, e.g., VANDERBUILT, supra note 44, at 53 - 54. 
48These are, of course, all arbitrary divisions.  VANDERBUILT, supra note 44, at 52-54. 
49Id. 
50Robert J. Martineau, Appellate Litigation: Its Place in the Law School Curriculum, 39 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 71, 72-3 (1989). 
51VANDERBUILT, supra note 44, at 54. 
52For interesting anecdotes about the law school experiences of notable American jurists 
see VANDERBUILT, supra note 44, at 39-46. 
53But see, Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological 
Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 93 (1968).  See also, Duncan Kennedy, How 
the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 71 (1970). 
54Mudd, supra note 3, at 705. 
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Even though lawyers and legal educators use the phrase thinking like a 
lawyer without great precision, recurrent concepts are associated with it.  
The first-year law student knows that briefing cases has something to do 
with it.  The training typically found in first-year classrooms would also 
concern the ability to analyze facts and appreciate the shifting legal results 
produced by factual nuances, to separate a complicated problem into its 
component parts, to assemble facts into a meaningful whole; and, in 
running through it all, a capacity of ferreting out of a problem those 
features relevant to its resolution.  These are at least common themes in 
first-year courses.55 
The traditional method of training law students that is employed in the first-year 
of their studies is specifically designed to yield an environment that exposes them to 
a distinct experience.  The use of this method in the classroom can, for example, 
expose relatively large numbers of students to doctrinal concepts, help them see how 
these doctrines are related (often inter-related), and give them a basic working 
understanding of how the legal process operates.  These are all laudable and 
necessary elements of a rudimentary legal education.  This is why the doctrinal case-
law method is particularly useful in first-year law classes.  These students need to 
stretch and modify the analytical skills that have placed them into law school.  They 
need to develop the specialized use of these skills in the context of legal analysis and 
decision-making.56  In other words, first year law students are expected to learn a 
new ontology;57 they are expected to see and think about the world in a new way.  
The narrow notion of “thinking like a lawyer” is an expression of this ontology in the 
context of the litigation and adversary culture of American law.  The case-law 
method has proven to be a relatively effective and efficient way of assisting students 
in this process of epistemological transformation. 
B.  To Be...or Not To Be 
This narrow conception of “thinking like a lawyer” helps introduce entering law 
students to the ontology of law.  What if no such ontology exists, however?  Critics 
have frequently assailed the sort of ontological conceptualization that is proposed 
above and maintained that lawyers (and law students) think in essentially the same 
way that other professionals do.  I ultimately reject this argument for the reasons 
outlined above.  Further, I reject this proposition based on the idea that before this 
sort of epistemological constancy can be discerned, novice actors in any particular 
domain must be initiated through rudimentary experiences before they can employ 
their mature reasoning abilities.  In short, it may be that mature practitioners in 
                                                                
55Id.  
56In the words of James Boyd White, “[t]he student’s mind is trained, of course, in a 
specific professional context–it is the language of the law, not of medicine or linguistics that 
the law student learns to understand, to recast, to remake–and this part of her training is . . . 
important.”  White, supra note 23, at 161.  
57As Richard Neumann puts it, “[t]his kind of knowledge is, after all, one of the 
characteristics of a profession.  To a lay person, the knowledge seems magical, but to 
professional it is part of the state of being, so ingrained that the professional cannot imagine 
life without it.”  Neumann, supra note 3, at 408. 
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medicine, law and the arts think in remarkably similar ways,58 but initiates to these 
professions decidedly do not. 
Several persuasive arguments contend that the substance behind what we mean 
when we say that we teach our students to “think like lawyers” is not a distinct 
ontology.59  Proponents of this position maintain that the analytical skills that we are 
trying to teach are of a sort that any professional school might teach.60  That is to say, 
that the sort of clear analytical and logical thinking skills which we hope our students 
will develop during their law school experience is no different than the sort that 
medical students receive from medical school, or those that managers receive from 
business school.61  This seems intuitively correct on at least two levels.  First, it 
should go without saying that we are trying to teach law students to think clearly and 
critically.  The educational process found in law schools, like almost any educational 
process,62 is meant to help students augment and develop their basic analytical 
skills.63  The sort of analytical and cognitive skills which enable students to think 
critically are, perhaps, a universal part of human understanding that can be employed 
in any field.64  In this sense, to say that we are trying to teach students how to employ 
their basic critical reasoning abilities is tautological.  As legal education is a species 
of education, legal educators are, of course, involved in the enterprise of helping 
students develop and broaden their analytical abilities.  This, however, is not saying 
much.   
The second level involves a more complex epistemological point.  I suspect that 
those who maintain that there are cognitive constants that cut across domains of 
intellectual endeavor are suggesting something more profound.65  On this level, it 
seems correct to say that there are some analytical and critical reasoning abilities that 
serve as the foundation of our learning about and understanding of the world.66  In 
this context, Dean John Mudd suggests that “skilled and well trained intellects 
operate in the same general fashion whether the grist for their intellectual mills be 
philosophy, law, science, or politics.”67   
                                                                
58Neumann, supra note 3, at 404. 
59Mudd, supra note 3, at 705-6. 
60See, e.g., Mudd, supra note 3. 
61Id.  See also, Emily Calhoun, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 507 (1984). 
62There are, of course, educational environments where the reality is simply that students 
are expected to memorize and regurgitate information.  Ostensibly, however, the educational 
models employed are in theory at least supposed to develop the analytical abilities of the 
students. 
63Mudd, supra note 3, at 705. 
64Id. 
65In fact, John Mudd, who argues this point persuasively, has taught philosophy as well as 
law.  This fact is enlightening in the present context. 
66IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1965) (“B” ed. 1787).  For a discussion of 
the a priori in Kant’s epistemology see HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL 
IDEALISM (1983). 
67Mudd, supra note 3, at 705. 
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Dean Mudd relies, in part, on the work of the philosopher and scientist Michael 
Polanyi in making this assertion.68  The bulk of Polanyi’s work is a meta-theoretical 
examination of epistemology.69  Polanyi maintains that all domains of human 
intellectual endeavor are formed by an inchoate understanding, which “dwells in” the 
critical reasoning of each of us.70  It is this “dwelling in” that enables us to employ 
our reasoning in different contexts.  This is a sort of intellectual emersion, which 
enables us to fully utilize the true range of our critical reasoning abilities.71  
Discussing this in the context of mathematics, Polanyi states: 
Between the practice of hackneyed exercises on the one hand and the 
heuristic visions of the lonely discoverer on the other, lies the major 
domain of established mathematics on which the mathematician 
consciously dwells by losing himself in the contemplation of its greatness.  
A true understanding of science and mathematics includes the capacity for 
a contemplative experience of them, and the teaching of these sciences 
must aim at imparting this capacity to the pupil.72 
Polanyi further states, in attempting to expand this discussion beyond the hard 
sciences, that: 
The task of inducing an intelligent contemplation of music and dramatic 
art aims likewise at enabling a person to surrender himself to works of art.  
This is neither to observe nor to handle them, but to live in them.  Thus 
the satisfaction of gaining intellectual control over the external world is 
linked to a satisfaction of gaining control over ourselves.73 
Though he never explicitly states it, we might imagine that this process can take 
place in the context of the study of law.  Dean Mudd certainly thinks so.74   
Implicit in this argument is the idea that one must have a certain exposure to the 
domain in question.  The language and basic conceptual paradigms of any particular 
domain must be grasped on at least a rudimentary level before the emersion 
suggested by Polanyi and Mudd can be attained.  A basic working knowledge of the 
terminology and conceptual frameworks of mathematics and art (and law) are 
necessary in order for the student to see how their contemplative experience of these 
domains of study can open up their understanding in this more complete and rich 
way.  Law school, especially the first year, is meant to provide the rudimentary 
                                                                
68Id. 
69The most widely noted and frequently cited example of this work can be found in 
Polanyi’s book MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (Chicago:  Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1958). 
70Id. at 195-202. 
71This position of Polanyi’s rests on the Kantian assumption about the adequacy of a 
priori human reason.  See KANT, supra note 66. 
72POLANYI, supra note 69, at 195-96. 
73Id. at 196. 
74Mudd, supra note 3, at 705. 
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training that will enable those who pass through the experience to attain the currency 
and understanding that Polanyi and Mudd hope for. 
It seems that both the superficial notion of how legal education can (and should) 
help students build and augment their critical reasoning skills, and the more complex 
epistemological discussion about how our faculties of understanding feed into our 
ability to immerse ourselves or “dwell in” our vision of how our world fits together 
across domains, are true.  However, these are not the levels on which the present 
discussion about teaching law students “how to think like lawyers” must be 
examined.  Between the time that students enter law school and the point at which 
they may achieve the conscious dwelling-in the law that accomplished practitioners 
manage, there is a place where neophytes must learn the language, culture and 
process of the law.75  This is the role that “thinking like a lawyer” plays in the legal 
academy.  “Thinking like a lawyer” is, in Polanyi’s language, a hackneyed and 
formalist set of exercises and experiences, which caricature mature practices and 
abilities, but which introduces students, in rudimentary fashion, to important 
foundational concepts.76  The experiences that law schools provide for the entering 
student, under the guise of “thinking like a lawyer,” are central to their subsequent 
understanding of and familiarity with the law.77  The sort of experiences that law 
students gain in law school start the process that will ultimately lead to the students’ 
understanding of how this works in the larger context of the American legal system.   
As a result, the superficial notion of equating “thinking like a lawyer” with basic 
analytical and critical thinking skills aims too low.  Part of the purpose of legal 
education is certainly to help students develop stronger and more robust critical and 
analytical skills.78  Basic analytical skills are (or should be) taught and augmented 
throughout one’s education.  Education from K-12 and through college focuses on 
the sort of analytical and cognitive skills to which the superficial notion refers.79  We 
                                                                
75Elkins, supra note 3, at 519. 
76See POLANYI, supra note 69, at 195-96. 
77OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  To paraphrase Holmes, 
students must experience the law.  In his seminal treatise THE COMMON LAW, Holmes said: 
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.  The felt necessities of 
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intentions of public policy, avowed 
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have 
had a great deal more to do that the syllogism in determining the rules by which men 
should be governed.  The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through 
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and 
corollaries of a book of mathematics.  In order to know what it is, we must know what 
it has been and what it tends to be.  We must assuredly consult history and existing 
theories of legislation. 
Id.   
78Mudd, supra note 3, at 705. 
79Certainly there are ranges in abilities which must be accounted for.  We should, for 
instance, be conscious of opening the door to the legal academy to those who have not 
traditionally had access due to economic or societal disadvantage.  Every legal educator I 
know, however, maintains that we cannot teach 16 years of X (fill in the blank) in the first 
semester of law school.  All law students, then, must have a certain level of educational 
attainment in addition to analytical and critical reasoning potential in order to be successful.   
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might expect, then, that entering law students will have a basic set of analytical tools 
from which to begin their journey into the profession.80  This is, in fact, the case in 
the overwhelming number of instances.  To continue this process in law school is, 
arguably, a secondary mission of legal education.  If law school were like any other 
sort of analytical training, students would probably be better served by a year (or 
two, or three) of instruction in formal and informal logic (as well as rhetoric, 
political and social theory, and the like).  Few legal educators would prefer this 
method of instruction and training. 
On the other hand, the more complex and expansive notion concerning how these 
critical reasoning skills are in fact utilized by the human understanding aims too 
high.  Entering law students do not yet have the conceptual and contextual abilities to 
reach this level of emersion.81  My understanding of this epistemological position 
suggests that one must have passed through a period of indoctrination in order to 
“dwell in” an understanding of the law, which is sophisticated enough to utilize all of 
the pure reasoning capabilities that Polanyi and Mudd suggest can be brought to bear 
on a legal question (or any other sort of question).  It is not that they are wrong; 
rather, it is simply that the substance of their position presupposes some sort of 
working knowledge of the context of the domain(s) in which these complex abilities 
are being employed.  This sort of complex epistemological emersion is not for the 
uninitiated.   
Initiation plays a larger role in the process of legal education than most would 
care to admit.82  Before novices in the domain can hope to think and act in ways 
which we might expect from mature practitioners, these novices must undergo the 
rudimentary and stylized experiences encapsulated in the narrow notion of “thinking 
like a lawyer.”83  These experiences help students begin to feel and comprehend the 
law in a lived way.84  Without these experiences, a vital and formative core would be 
missing.  Initiation, then, gives students a foundation upon which more mature and 
fully formed understanding can be built.  This is the level on which we must examine 
the more common understanding of what we mean when we say we try to teach our 
students to “think like lawyers.” 
                                                                
80This is why admissions committees at law schools examine the college records of 
applicants, and why aspiring law students must take the Law School Admissions Test 
[hereinafter LSAT].  The presumption is that these are good indicators of whether any 
particular student has the requisite analytical and critical reasoning abilities to be successful in 
law school. 
81Saunders & Levine, supra note 12, at 142-43. 
82As Ramsfield puts it: “[t]he legal culture puts [students] in specific surroundings and 
under certain expectations.  These circumstances spring from traditions whose origins may be 
obscure but whose followers are devout.”  RAMSFIELD, supra note 26 at 7. 
83RAMSFIELD, supra note 26 at 7-20. 
84There is something phenomenological about this sort of experience.  This idea is a bit 
beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
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III.  HOW “THINKING LIKE A LAWYER” INITIATES NOVICES  
TO THE WORLD OF THE LAW 
Most people who have had any exposure to modern legal education would agree 
that law schools do not teach students everything they need to know to be lawyers.85  
Instead, the pedagogical model employed by legal educators is designed to give 
students a set of experiences that will prepare them to adequately and effectively 
identify, classify and address legal problems once they pass the bar examination and 
enter professional practice.86  This is what we might call a “domain specific” 
educational model.87  In other words, this model is designed to initiate bright and 
active intellects in to the world of the law in contemporary American practice.  
While students who enter law school have, on the whole, the type of analytical and 
critical reasoning skills that would enable them, if they were so inclined, to be 
successful in other professions, these students have chosen to attend law school.  It 
should be no small wonder, then, that these students must mold their analytical 
abilities in a way that is particular and distinct.88  Indeed, the terminology, culture 
and expectations of the legal profession are particular and distinct.89  In order to 
understand this, entering law students must learn how to think in ways that are 
common to others in the profession.90  This is what most legal educators mean when 
they say that law students must “learn to think like lawyers.”91 
This initiation process is designed to give entering law students a broad exposure 
to the language and logic of the legal profession.  In short, law school, especially in 
the first year, is designed to indoctrinate aspiring attorneys into a distinct world-
view92 or ontology.93  It is not that law students must somehow develop unique or 
different analytical capabilities than their peers in other fields; rather, that they must 
learn to employ them differently.94  As former Dean of the New York University 
School of Law Arthur Vanderbilt once said: 
The reasoning of the lawyer, it will be seen from the elements with which 
he deals, is not the reasoning of the logician, the mathematician, the 
scientist or the philosopher, though there is much he may learn from them.  
His reasoning differs from each of theirs, as theirs, in turn, differs from 
that of the historian, the biographer, the economist, the sociologist, the 
                                                                
85Saunders & Levine, supra note 12, at 123. 
86See Schultz, supra note 2. 
87Saunders & Levine, supra note 12, at 142-43. 
88See Schultz, supra note 2, at 68. 
89Elkins, supra note 3, at 519-20. 
90See Schultz, supra note 2, at 68; Elkins, supra note 3, at 519-20. 
91See Neumann, supra note 3, at 405. 
92See Elkins, supra note 3, at 525, 529. 
93See Neumann, supra note 3, at 408. 
94See White, supra note 23, at 160-62. 
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accountant and the statistician, from each of whom the law student may 
also gain much.95 
It is “the elements with which a lawyer deals” that sets the profession apart.  The 
most vital part of a law student’s education, in many respects, is the introduction and 
assimilation of how these elements operate within the framework of the American 
legal system.   
In all practical terms, “thinking like a lawyer” means gaining experiences in and 
about the operation of the American legal system.96  Law school, especially the first 
year curriculum, is designed to give these experiences.  Dean Vanderbilt recognized 
this when he stated: 
The first year at law school is the year with the greatest formative effect 
on the professional life of a young lawyer.  It is then that he should 
acquire the lawyer’s ability to absorb facts and rules accurately and 
quickly, to search for the controlling reasons for a rule of law, to employ 
these rules in hypothetical situations, to acquire the capacity for hard, 
prolonged intellectual labor, and to develop a genuine interest in the law 
as an important aspect of life.97 
This formative experience is important in that it prepares aspiring lawyers for the 
culture they are about to enter.  It is, in this sense, a rite of passage.  As my property 
professor in law school, Jerome Shuman, stated, “law school is a crucible which 
transforms students into lawyers.”  While this philosophy may have been overstated, 
the point is well taken; in order to understand the expectations and cultural mores of 
the legal profession, students should be exposed to a common educational experience 
(common to both their fellow students and to those who have gone before them).98  It 
is from this experience that students will gain their respect for and working 
knowledge of the law. 
This is such an important part of a neophyte lawyer’s training because she must 
have this foundation on which to build as she augments her analytical and critical 
skills in the context of her professional life.99  A lawyer may use the same sort of 
reasoning skills that mathematicians or artists or philosophers use, but it is the 
context in which these reasoning abilities are employed that give them expression.100  
The only way to build this foundation is by being initiated into the culture of the 
                                                                
95See VANDERBILT, supra note 44, at 19. 
96See Smith, supra note 3, at 10 (“[a] deeper understanding of what it means to think like a 
lawyer requires an understanding of the context within which the practice of law occurs.”). 
97Smith, supra note 3, at 7. 
98I do not mean “common” in the sense of “identical” or “standardized”.  Anyone familiar 
with legal education knows that there is very little in the way of standardized content, even 
across sections in a law school which use the same case book.  In this context, I believe that a 
common educational experience suggests more in the way of tone or approach rather than 
content. 
99Neumann, supra note 3, at 408. 
100Smith, supra note 3, at 10.  See also, supra notes 25 and 26, and accompanying text. 
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domain.101  Entering law students are expected to learn more about the culture of the 
law than they are about the formal logic and epistemology behind their reasoning 
process102 or the reasoning process of other actors in the legal system.103  It is the 
culture that gives students’ thinking abilities tangible expression.  This is why 
professors at virtually every law school in America employ essentially the same 
method104 to expose entering law students to a culture that other members of the 
profession share by common experience.  The common educational experiences of 
professional attorneys are necessary to both define who they are as professionals, and 
give them a point of departure from which to develop their own voice.105  The most 
consistent experiences of this “cultural education,” especially early in a law student’s 
career, are the combined array of persuasive traits known as advocacy skills.106 
Legal pedagogy in America rests on the principle that our system is an adversary 
system.107  This adversary system is based on the opportunity of competing parties to 
push their positions on a legal problem to a resolution in which one party wins and 
another loses.  Since lawyers act as advocates for the parties in these disputes, law 
students need to learn the nature and extent of this sort of representation.  As 
interpreted, the phrase “learning to think like a lawyer” is almost invariably linked 
(at least in the law school context) to a notion of advocacy played out by competing 
lawyers who represent adversaries with competing interests.108   
The majority of law professors concentrate on the idea that American lawyers 
work within an adversary system.109  This is the litigation model that is an implicit, 
but necessary, part of the Langdellian case law method.110  The method of discourse 
                                                                
101Smith, supra note 3, at 10. 
102There are notable examples of those who do try to reduce legal reasoning to a more or 
less formal logic.  See, e.g., SHELDON MARGULIES & KENNETH LASSON, LEARNING LAW: THE 
MASTERY OF LEGAL LOGIC (1993); ALDISERT, supra note 46; PIERRE SCHLAG & DAVID 
SKOVER, TACTICS OF LEGAL REASONING (1986). 
103Nor are they explicitly taught about “the political and moral philosophies that 
accompany various approaches to legal thinking.”  Elkins, supra note 3, at 516. 
104The level of effectiveness with which individual professors employ this method varies 
widely.  See VANDERBILT, supra note 44, at 53. 
105According to Stanley Fish, “[a] professional must find a way to operate in the context of 
purposes, motivations, and possibilities that precede and even define him and yet maintain the 
conviction that he is ‘essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities.’” STANLEY 
FISH, Anti-Professionalism, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1992).  From my point of view, the 
common ground in the legal profession that enables initiates to carry out this task is the 
advocacy system. 
106VANDERBUILT, supra note 44, at 9.   
107Van Valkenburg, supra note 6. 
108Schultz, supra note 2, at 59. 
109For an interesting discussion on the art of persuasion in this context see Joseph W. 
Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L.R. 2442 (1989).  See also, Van Valkenburg, supra note 6. 
110See Saunders & Levine, supra note 12, at 126.  See also William J. Woodward, Jr., 
Clearing the Underbrush for Real-Life Contracting, 24 L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 99, 103 (1999). 
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and instruction in law classes, especially in first year courses, drives home to 
students the idea that judicial opinions (invariably from appellate courts) are the 
principle form of legal thinking which should be emulated.  Walter Van Valkenburg 
describes this clearly when he states: 
From the curriculum, the student learns that the law consists of how courts 
deal with disputes between private parties, and to a lesser extent how 
courts deal with disputes between private parties and the state. . . .  Other 
functions of law and other ways in which disputes might be resolved are 
not perceived to be an important part of law study, at least during the first 
year.111 
Nancy Schultz says this even more bluntly when she states that “law schools send 
the message that law is litigation.”112  This is true even in the face of overwhelming 
evidence that a vast majority of disputes settle before they even get into the litigation 
stream.113   
By pushing the notion that the study of law is best accomplished by reading and 
discussing appellate cases, law professors set in place and continually reinforce the 
notion that our conception of law is essentially a zero-sum game.114  By employing 
this method as extensively as we do, we are teaching our students that arguing a 
cause (any cause which they are assigned) as fervently and competently as they can 
is what being a lawyer is all about.115  “Thinking like a lawyer,” then, requires law 
students to think strategically and competitively, always calculating the best 
possibilities for winning given the complex factual and legal variables with which 
they have been presented.116  By and large, it is a law student’s ability to think in this 
manner that we are attempting to evaluate in traditional law school exams.  In this 
model, lawyering, and hence “thinking like a lawyer,” is characterized by the ability 
of students to read, understand, digest and be able to discuss the arguments they find 
in judicial opinions.117 
Van Valkenburg calls this the “judicialization” of conflict.118  This disposition, he 
says, leads legal educators to focus “excessively on borderline cases which might 
                                                                
111Van Valkenburg, supra note 6, at 598. 
112Schultz, supra note 2, at 59. 
113Miller & Sarat, supra note 41, at 536-46.   
114See Schultz, supra note 2 at 64-65.  This is beginning to change, however.  The authors 
and editors of some first-year case books are lessening the emphasis on appellate cases, and 
introducing students to a wider range of practice and non-litigation materials.  An interesting 
example is STEWART MACAULAY, ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995). 
115Elkins, supra note 3, at 519.  See also, Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in “Legal 
Analysis”: A Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 420 (1986); Anthony Kronman, 
Forward: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 959 (1981). 
116Richard Neumann identifies this as a “heightened form of skepticism.”  See Neumann, 
supra note 3, at 405. 
117Elkins, supra note 3, at 521-22. 
118Van Valkenburg, supra note 6, at 586. 
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reasonably be decided either way.”119  This has a profound effect upon a student’s 
understanding of what “thinking like a lawyer” means.  The context which students 
use to make sense of their new and expanding cognitive and practical skills abilities 
revolves around litigation and advocacy in the adversarial system.120  This allows 
students to see the malleability and ambiguity of law,121 illustrating for them how 
argumentation, persuasion and sagacity can literally form opinion and reality.122  It 
teaches them, in short, to understand the value of thinking in what Robert Condlin 
calls “persuasion mode.”123 
The idea that “thinking like a lawyer” translates to understanding conflict in the 
context of the litigation system is widespread throughout the profession.124  This is 
true throughout popular culture as well.125  These perceptions are related to the fact 
that the American legal system is, like it or not, litigation driven at some level.126  As 
a result, advocacy is certainly a core skill that any aspiring attorney needs to learn,127 
as are the corresponding set of skills associated with the litigation process.128  The 
law school experience is the student’s first introduction to this environment.  Since 
these skills are so central to the widespread perceptions of what it means to be a 
lawyer, it should be no surprise that the early initiation into the profession which is 
encapsulated in the first year of law school revolves around the themes of advocacy 
and the adversary process.129  As James Elkins has said, the law school curriculum is 
designed to give students: 
[t]he ability to ground legal pronouncements in the “facts” the ability to 
discern fact and opinion that is significant for judicial decision-making, 
the ability to argue a position and urge an outcome based on selection of 
                                                                




123Robert J. Condlin, Socrates’ New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in 
Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223, 231-234 (1981). 
124Much of the literature on “thinking like a lawyer” uses litigation or advocacy themes as 
examples.  See, e.g., William H. Simon, “Thinking Like a Lawyer” About Ethical Problems, 
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facts and interpretation of legal opinion, and the belief that judicial 
opinions establish the “law.”  These abilities bring with them the sense 
that the student has deepened her ability to reason, advocate, counsel, 
defend, and legislate.  When this education takes hold, the student feels 
more sensible, objective, rational, and purposeful.  The student believes 
she has become a person capable of “legal thinking.”130 
This introduction is a necessary part of becoming a member of the profession.  
One must pass through this period of artificial, compartmentalized and stilted 
thinking before the more complex and sophisticated reasoning abilities that are the 
mark of the mature practitioner can take bud and flourish.131 
This position has been frequently criticized by thoughtful commentators,132 who 
maintain that the litigation focus ingrains in students a combativeness and uni-
dimensionality that blinds them to the subtle and complex textures of actual law 
practice.133  While discussing this criticism in more detail below, I believe that it 
makes a bit too much out of the lessons that law students can take away from this 
initial focus on litigation and the adversary system.  It is certainly a problem if law 
students fail to move beyond the sort of hackneyed adversarialism and superficial 
advocacy that characterizes the narrow notion of “thinking like a lawyer.”  It is the 
job of legal educators, however, to make sure that this does not happen.  Gutting the 
narrow notion of “thinking like a lawyer” which is advanced here, and replacing it 
with a more ungamely and expansive notion, which includes a whole host of things 
that law students (at any level) would be hard pressed to understand,134 is 
counterproductive.  Before discussing this in more depth, however, a few things must 
be said about why it is important to focus, even if for the comparatively short time of 
the first year of law school, on this litigation and adversary context.  The next 
section, sets forth several reasons why concentrating on the traditional litigation 
focus serves an important formative purpose for first year law students. 
IV.  THE ROLE OF ADVOCACY, LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN 
TEACHING STUDENTS HOW TO “THINK LIKE LAWYERS” 
Law students need to learn the extent to which legal problems can and should be 
dealt with in an adversarial way, and how the litigation process deals with these 
problems.135  There are at least three reasons why this sort of indoctrination is useful 
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in the educational process of those who wish to be lawyers.  First, since litigation and 
the adversarial process are such a central focus of the American legal system anyone 
even remotely connected to that system needs substantial exposure to the process.  
Secondly, the litigation process is a discrete and structured process that can introduce 
the entering student to fundamental contextual and procedural concepts in a way 
which is reasonably rational and understandable.136  Finally, by working through the 
legal doctrines that they are expected to master in the context of the adversary 
process, law students can see firsthand how blunt the law is as a mechanism of social 
control. 
The American legal system is, at its base, an adversarial system that employs (or 
uses the threat of employing) litigation to resolve conflicting claims.137  Though 
many students who go to law school will not primarily work in situations that utilize 
the litigation process, and a substantial percentage may never even work in the law 
per se, their understanding of this system and how it operates is central to their being 
a member of the profession.138  In fact, this seems to be one of those domain defining 
understandings that was discussed above.  At some level, it makes little sense to 
think of one as having a working knowledge of the legal domain if they do not have 
a thorough understanding of the adversarial litigation system.139  In this sense, such 
an initiation to the litigation context of the adversary system seems to be a threshold 
beyond which one must pass before she can credibly be considered a member of the 
profession.  In essence, as one develops the cognitive skills which will develop over 
time into the ability to “think like a lawyer” it seems vital that this development take 
place in the context of the adversary system.140  This is, after all, the vital core of the 
American legal system.141  Understanding, and being initiated into, the adversary 
system, then, (or being able to operate in “persuasion mode” as Richard Neumann 
states142) is an important part of learning to “think like a lawyer.” 
The elements of the litigation process in the adversary system are also useful as 
illustrations of how the doctrines and jurisprudential concepts extant in the American 
legal system operate.  While law may not be the science that Langdell and others 
argued,143 it is useful for students to be exposed to the grundnorms of the American 
adversary system, as this system illustrates clearly and often starkly the capabilities 
of our conception of law when it comes to resolving difficult and intractable 
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137See Miller & Sarat, supra note 41, at 531-33. 
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disputes.  In effect, the litigation context provides a framework within which 
“thinking like a lawyer” makes sense.144  To a large extent, the sort of strategic and 
competitive mentality that we drill into our law students is helpful in showing them 
how the paths of the law operate.  Law students endlessly search for structure.  The 
legal structure found in the adversary process is an artificial one, but it is nonetheless 
helpful in that it provides an epistemological tether for those who are adrift in the 
maelstrom of a new ontology.  As James Boyd White has said, introducing students 
to the law in this way can be transforming and empowering.145  This would suggest, 
then, that the very structure of the adversarial system is formative in the sense that it 
is itself a constituent part of the ontology of the law.  This does not mean to suggest 
that the adversarial process and the litigation adjuncts which go along with it should 
be reified.  It is simply that as the conceptual framework of the adversary system is a 
prerequisite to an understanding of the domain of the law, it may reasonably be said 
that the usefulness of that very framework is formative.  
The final reason why the adversary process is used as a backdrop for legal 
education is that this process is instructive in the weaknesses in the legal system as a 
whole.  The American legal system, like any legal system, is largely inadequate to 
the task of guiding and controlling social interaction.146  Many students arrive at law 
school assuming, like most citizens, that the legal system is a comprehensive and 
complete tapestry which can help members of the society attain justice and fairness.  
A cursory exposure to the actual workings of the system, however, reveals an 
ineffectual (and sometimes even retrograde) social structure that simply can not 
effect the sort of wide-spread social control that most people tacitly assume.147  This 
is a vitally important lesson for aspiring attorneys, as knowing the limitations of 
one’s profession is as important as knowing its capabilities. An extensive and 
comprehensive knowledge of the adversary system is the best way to achieve this 
background knowledge.  Only by working through the doctrines that collectively 
comprise the corpus we expect law students to be familiar with will the limitations 
that were hinted at become evident.  A thoroughgoing appreciation of the advocacy 
system, then, is a central and important part of any law student’s education. 
For these reasons (and quite probably many more) an exposure to and 
understanding of the adversary system is an absolutely vital and central part of what 
it means to “think like a lawyer.”  All law students, on their way to becoming full-
fledged members of the profession, must understand how thinking in these 
competitive and adversarial ways drives the litigation system.  They must learn to 
argue all sides of an issue, and to take the perspective of one party and push that 
concern as fully as possible.148  Law students must be able to view these skills in the 
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context of a zero-sum game.149  This ability is so important, in fact, that it might 
reasonably be said that this way of “thinking like a lawyer” is a necessary foundation 
for later skills and reasoning abilities that students will be exposed to throughout 
their student and professional careers.  Before one can adequately envision 
alternatives to litigation, they must fully understand the modes of thinking which lie 
behind the litigation system and our adversarial culture. 
A working knowledge of the advocacy system is what we might call an 
epistemological precursor.  In order for one to be successful in the domain of the 
law, i.e., if law students are to achieve that level of emersion that Polanyi and Mudd 
maintain is a sign of competent understanding, they must learn to think of the law 
through the lens of the advocacy system.  This is what most legal educators 
implicitly refer to when they say that our task is to teach law students to “think like 
lawyers.”   
The importance of this educational initiation, then, can not be overstated.  Nor 
should the value of its importance, however, be over-emphasized.  To take the sort of 
narrow analytical perspective identified as “thinking like a lawyer” too far can be 
disastrous.  As James Elkins states, “[w]hen thinking like a lawyer is invested with 
crude meaning, as a syndrome, a map, a miniature worldview, or a simplified amoral 
adversarialism, the result is injustice.”150 Taking this ontology too far instigates what 
Elkins calls a mentality of “legalism.”151  This is, he notes, decidedly not a 
compliment.152  The mentality of legalism “make[s] a fetish of rules and [leads 
students to] view with suspicion those ideals and beliefs rules can never fully 
embrace.153  The problem with legalism is that it prohibits moral, political, and social 
discourse.”154  While learning to “think like a lawyer” is a vital part of any law 
student’s training, getting trapped at that juncture can have serious consequences to 
the student’s continuing development.  
This is where the work of Polanyi and Mudd comes into play.  Once a student has 
been initiated into the domain of inquiry, she must then move beyond the hackneyed 
exercises of mere formalism in order to further develop.  The true complexity and 
subtleties associated with the actual practice of law require that new lawyers move 
beyond the period of legalism to become competent professionals.155  A mature 
understanding of law and the legal system cannot focus on the use of litigation as a 
primary means of resolving disputes, and the advocacy model employed in the 
context of an adversary culture must ultimately be seen as a superficial and 
retrograde disposition.  In other words, as students move from novice to more expert 
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150Elkins, supra note 3, at 522. 
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modes of thinking and doing, they must move beyond “thinking like lawyers” to 
becoming lawyers.  The more mature understanding that students and young 
practitioners attain when they make this move is better described as “lawyering,” as 
it incorporates both legal and non-legal analytical and practical skills in a more 
comprehensive and normatively useful package.  The next section discusses why this 
move is important, and why maintaining the narrow notion of “thinking like a 
lawyer” does not inhibit the effect of those who want lawyers to have a more 
pragmatic and utilitarian set of cognitive and practical skills.  In fact, retaining the 
narrow conception of “thinking like a lawyer” frees up conceptual room for a more 
expansive notion of what should follow the narrow conceptualization. 
V.  SEEING BEYOND ADVERSARIALISM 
“Thinking like a lawyer” is only effective as a step in the eventual development 
of a professional maturity.  While thinking in this way is an important step in a 
student’s development, it is vital that they not get trapped in this mode of thinking.  
This narrow notion of “thinking like a lawyer” is largely unreflective and uncritical, 
and can numb students to social and political concerns that non-lawyers generally 
think are important and relevant.156  Maintaining this narrow worldview can 
significantly diminish the ability of (new) lawyers to adequately and competently 
represent the interests of clients.157  James Elkins states it poignantly when he says 
that by reifying the sort of narrow notion of “thinking like a lawyer” it “becomes the 
basis for a legal world view that crowds out other perspectives and ways of speaking, 
seeing, experiencing, and understanding the world.”158  This is what Elkins calls 
“legalism.”159  Since this narrow notion of thinking is highly stylized and formal, 
much the way mathematical or logical proofs are for students of mathematics or 
philosophy, it is stripped of any real moral or ethical content.160  “Thinking like a 
lawyer” has its applications in the context of learning about the law and its uses, and 
may even be helpful in those situations where students (or lawyers) need to be able 
to think legalistically.  While this worldview is certainly helpful as a stage in the 
development, then, it is a stage that students must be urged to work through.161  
Students who remain at this level of development fail to see that there is more to 
modern legal practice than adversary relationships and a zero-sum calculus.162 
Ontologizing legalism has serious implications in terms of students’ abilities to 
look beyond the litigation context of the adversary system.  The worldview that new 
law students adopt because of the educational process they are subjected to forces 
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them to view law and legal practice in a narrow and largely uncomplicated way.163 
This creates a tension between their rudimentary understanding of law in the larger 
context of society and the standards of competent and adequate practice.164  Elkins 
describes the effect of this tension: 
[Legalism] distorts and deforms the lives of students (and no small 
number of law teachers) in enough ways to make it less than the whole 
truth about becoming a lawyer.  Students of law know firsthand the cost 
of their initiation of learning to think like a lawyer.  In their underground, 
antinomian narratives, students articulate what traditional legalists deny: 
legal thinking is not the final prize.  When we break through the dominant 
ideology, we find stories that put legal discourse in a new light.165 
As I am not a “traditional legalist,” I agree with Elkins’ argument that the sort of 
unreflective legalism associated with taking the narrow notion of thinking like a 
lawyer too far puts students in an ideological and conceptual bind.  It creates a 
disjunction between their incomplete conceptual understanding of the law and how it 
works in society and their responsibility as practitioners.166 
This disjunction is particularly acute when it comes to skills training and 
practical learning experiences.167  Students who are exposed to practical skills 
training (for example, ADR, clinical experiences, counseling, interviewing, etc.) 
after they have integrated the legalist mentality often find it difficult to change hats 
and become non-adversarial.168  This is a problem that all members of the legal 
academy must address.  As professional education is ideally an ongoing enterprise, 
we must show students how they can continue to add to their conceptual and 
practical knowledge throughout their careers. 
It has been argued that legal educators should expand the notion of what it means 
to “think like a lawyer.”169  The advocates of this position note that the restrictive and 
narrow view about what counts as legal reasoning gives a limited and unrealistic 
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perception as to the role lawyers play in society.170  As Nancy Schultz says, 
“[t]hinking like a lawyer is a much richer and more intricate process than collecting 
and manipulating doctrine.”171  While this is undoubtedly true at some level, the real 
point that Schultz and others who argue for a more robust notion of what “thinking 
like a lawyer” means lies in their belief that skills training should be an accepted 
(and valued) part of the law school curriculum.172  Indeed, she explicitly notes this 
when she says that legal educators and administrators “need to acknowledge the 
importance of a much broader range of skills than has traditionally been the focus of 
the law school curriculum.”173  This approach suggests that we define “thinking like 
a lawyer” to include all approaches to a problem that a lawyer may take, and that we 
expand the notion of lawyering to encompass whatever a lawyer does in the course 
of her work.174   
While I support the idea that lawyers should be able to employ a wide variety of 
skills, defining all of these skills as “thinking like a lawyer” simply because lawyers 
use them is not coherent.175  Defining the sort of “people skills” that are involved in a 
more robust notion of conflict resolution as “thinking like a lawyer,” for instance, 
does not seem to make much sense.  In fact, we could probably even say that one 
would be better at resolving many conflicts if she were to not “think like a lawyer.”  
In my view, then, lawyers need to have several sets of skills; some legal, some non-
legal.176  Knowing when to employ each, and in what measure, is a subtle and 
delicate balance that only comes with experience and practice.177  It seems to me that 
we ought to adopt a wider notion of professional “lawyering” that encompasses both 
legal skills (on the narrow advocacy scale) as well as non-legal people and 
interactive skills (that focus on wider sorts of extra-legal/judicial problem solving). 
The upshot of Schultz’s position, then, is vitally important.  Law students need to 
be exposed to much more than just the narrow mentality of “thinking like a lawyer.”  
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Law schools should have skills classes–both legal and non-legal skills–as a core and 
central part of the curriculum.178  In Schultz’s words, “law schools should adjust their 
curricula to acknowledge the increasing complexity of the world of legal practice 
and to focus on what students must know to function in that world…”179  As students 
move past the superficial legalism of “thinking like a lawyer,” they must develop 
professional identities that incorporate all of their skills and focus them on their 
responsibilities as professionals.180  If we do not force students to move through the 
initial stage of their professional development, which is characterized by the narrow 
legalism that we call “thinking like a lawyer,” students will be ill-equipped to open 
their minds to non-legal or extra-legal resolutions to problems that their clients 
face.181  Students (and many lawyers) too often view this retrograde legalism as a 
default that can be employed without discrimination.182  As Van Valkenburg 
suggests, not moving beyond the legalism of their initial training causes law students 
to “take an aggressive, non-conciliatory posture with respect to individual disputes, 
fosters a tendency in lawyers to overestimate the merits of their positions, and 
encourages them to view disputes in the abstract, without regard to the social and 
personal costs of litigation.”183  This causes them to yield a blunt instrument in 
situations which are better handled with more delicate instrumentalities. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The phrase “thinking like a lawyer” maintains as much relevance to today’s legal 
academy as it ever has.  In the face of recent criticism that the ideas connected with 
the concept of “thinking like a lawyer,” e.g., the case law method with its focus on 
the adversarial litigation process, the fact is that legal educators must still teach their 
students to “think like lawyers.”  Critics have complained that the narrow focus of 
this traditional concept unduly restricts the ability of law students to develop refined 
analytical and practical skills which go beyond the adversarial context.184  In one 
sense these critics are correct.  New lawyers need to move beyond the narrow focus 
that the set of skills which the term “thinking like a lawyer” entails.  This does not 
mean, however, that entering law students should not be exposed to the traditional 
methods of analysis and reasoning that the law school curriculum has been designed 
to highlight.  On the contrary, it is vitally important that all law students be exposed 
to the narrow notion of “thinking like a lawyer.”  This ensures a conceptually and 
professionally congruent entre to the community they chose to join.  It is, in a larger 
sense, a lived experience which all lawyers share in the acting out of their 
professional being.  In essence, the notion of “thinking like a lawyer” that law school 
professors have traditionally inculcated is an ontology that lawyers need in order to 
become a member of the community of practitioners.  After students are initiated in 
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this ontology, they are prepared to more critically assess the strengths and weakness 
of the traditional adversarial method of problem solving.  Once this is done, the more 
expansive skills of “lawyering” can be developed.  In other words, the set of skills 
which are inherent in the traditional concept of “thinking like a lawyer” are a 
necessary foundation for the more robust and developed skills and analytical abilities 
that practicing lawyers need to be effective practitioners. 
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